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Some Doubts About the Use of
Trusts to Avoid the Estate Tax
A popular method to avoid the estate tax is to place
property in an inter vivos trust that can only be altered
or revoked by someone over whom the settlor has a
certain moral suasion. In this Article, Professor Lowndes
examines this device against a background of both estate
tax and gift tax law. He concludes that recent develop-
ments in the gift tax area cast doubt on its efficacy in
avoiding the estate tax.
Charles L. B. Lowndes*
The most obvious way to avoid an estate tax is to give away
property during your life in order to get it out of your estate at
your death. In this connection an interesting question arises as to
whether it is possible to transfer property so as to remove it from
the transferor's taxable estate without actually parting with con-
trol over the property. It is generally assumed that this can be
done by means of an inter vivos trust under which one other than
the settlor of the trust (but one subject to his moral suasion) is
given power to alter or revoke the trust. Thus, if A wishes to give
property to B that will not be taxed to A's estate without com-
pletely relinquishing the power to recapture the property, he may
transfer the property to T in trust for B and empower T to alter
or revoke the trust. If A is careful to select a complaisant trustee,
he can retain control over the trust property through his influ-
ence over the trustee. If A outlives the presumptive period so that
the transfer to the trustee cannot be treated as a transfer in con-
templation of death,' he may escape an estate tax on the trust
property on the plea that he did not retain any legally recognized
interest in the property. This looks like an admirable way to
have your tax cake and eat it too. Avoidance of the estate tax by
means of a trust which can be altered or revoked by the trustee,
however, calls for very precise planning. There are, moreover, re-
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. There is a conclusive presumption that a transfer made more than three
years before the transferor's death is not in contemplation of death. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
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cent developments which cast doubt upon the feasibility of the
scheme even if it is precisely planned. Before turning to these
doubts it is advisable to examine the device itself. In this connec-
tion it will be convenient to talk about the estate tax first and then
about the gift tax.
I. ESTATE TAX
Until recently it seemed settled that trust property will not be
taxed to the estate of the settlor of the trust if he conferred power
upon persons other than himself to alter or revoke the trust.
Thus, the regulations provide that the existence of such a power in
another will not attract a tax either under section 2038,2 which
taxes revocable trusts, nor under section 2036,1 which taxes trusts
where the settlor retained power to designate the income from, or
the possession or enjoyment of, the transferred property during his
life. In Anna Ball Kneeland,4 the first case to raise this problem, a
decedent created an inter vivos trust for his wife with remainders
over to his children and provided that his wife might revoke
the trust. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the trust property
was not taxable to the decedent's estate because he had not re-
tained any interest in the trust property. The provisions of the
estate tax imposing the tax upon a trust where the settlor has
power to alter or revoke the trust' or to designate the income from
the trust property6 limit the tax to a situation where the settlor
must participate in the exercise of the power. Literally, the
language of the statute extends only to a situation where the set-
tlor alone or in conjunction with another person may exercise the
power; it does not provide for a tax where the power is vested
exclusively in one other than the settlor.
The person empowered to revoke the trust in the Kneeland
case was a beneficiary of the trust. Subsequent cases have held that
a trust is not taxable under the estate tax even though the power
to alter or revoke the trust is vested in a nonadverse person other
than the settlor of the trust.' Moreover, the regulations, which pro-
vide that the estate tax does not apply to powers vested in persons
other than the settlor of the trust, do not differentiate between ad-
verse and nonadverse holders of the power.8
2. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (3) (1958).
3. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958).
4. 34 B.T.A. 816 (1936).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
7. In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v.
Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b) (3), 2038-1(a) (3) (1958).
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Although it has been held that a trust that can be altered or re-
voked only by one other than the settlor of the trust is not taxable
to the settlor's estate, great care must be exercised to make sure
that power to affect the enjoyment of the trust is not inadvertently
retained by the settlor. If the settlor of a trust has power to alter
or revoke the trust, the trust property will be taxable to his estate
even though the power can be exercised only in conjunction with a
person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the trust.9 The
suggestion has been made in several cases that the settlor of a trust
does not possess power to alter or revoke a trust where the power
is vested in a trustee who can exercise the power only with the
consent of the settlor.10 The theory behind this contention is that
the power is lodged in the trustee and the settlor has simply a
veto over the trustee's exercise of the power. More sophisticated
decisions take a more realistic approach and dismiss any distinc-
tion between a power that can be exercised by the settlor of a
trust with the consent of the trustee and a power that can be ex-
ercised by the trustee with the consent of the settlor as a distinction
without a difference."1 In both cases the settlor is regarded as hav-
ing a joint power with the trustee, since the power can only be
exercised by the concurrent action of both parties, and regardless
of who must formally exercise the power, there is nothing to pre-
vent either party from initiating the exercise by suggesting such ac-
tion to the other.' It seems reasonably certain that a trust that
the trustee can alter or revoke will not escape the estate tax if the
settlor must consent to the exercise of the power.
9. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
There is a minor exception to this rule in the case of a transfer to a trust
that can be revoked by the settlor of the trust only with the consent of all
of the beneficiaries of the trust. This is regarded as a complete transfer that
is not taxable under the estate tax. Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U.S. 93
(1935).
10. See Estate of Arnold Resch, 20 T.C. 171 (1953); Estate of Clayton
W. Sherman, 9 T.C. 594 (1947); cf. Orrin G. Wood, 40 B.TA 905
(1939) (gift tax).
11. DuCharme's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1947);
Thorp's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1947); Goldstein's
Estate v. United Statei, 129 Ct. Cl. 264, 122 F. Supp. 677 (1954).
12. In DuCharme's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir.
1947), the court said:
Petitioner contends, however, that Paragraph 12 did not give the
decedent the right, in conjunction with another person, to designate the
persons' who shall enjoy the property, but that it merely gave the de-
cedent the power to veto a change requested by the wife. The con-
tention is supported by a strict construction of the phraseology of Para-
graph 12, but in our opinion places emphasis upon form rather than
upon substance. Regardless of who initiates or requests such a change,
the consent of both parties is required to make the change effective.
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Even though power to alter the beneficial enjoyment of trust
property is vested exclusively in the trustee or trustees of a trust.
the trustees' powers will be attributed to the settlor if he possesses
an unrestricted power to appoint himself a trustee, 3 and the
trust property will be taxable to his estate. If the settlor's power to
appoint himself trustee is subject to some contingency beyond his
control that has not occurred at his death, the trust property will
not be taxed to his estate under section 2038, which taxes revoca-
ble trusts, because the contingency prevents the power from being
in existence in the settlor at the settlor's death.14 It is not clear,
however, whether such a trust may be taxed under section 2036.
Although the regulations have finally submitted to the cases and
hold that a contingent power is not taxable under section 2 0 3 8,"a
they take a different view with regard to the taxation of contin-
gent powers under section 2036,16 where there does not seem to
As a practical matter, if the settlor desired to make a change and
the other party was willing that the change be made, the change could
be accomplished under the provisions of Paragraph 12 by having the
wife request the change agreed upon, even though it was originally
suggested by the settlor.
There is no practical distinction between a power to revoke a trust that
may be exercised by the trustee alone and a power to revoke a trust that
the trustee can only exercise with the consent of the settlor of the trust.
In either case the exercise of the power is ultimately dependent upon the
will of the trustee. A power to alter the beneficiaries of a trust that can be
exercised by the trustee alone differs from a power to alter the trust that can
be exercised by the trustee only with the consent of the settlor of the trust
to the extent that the latter power gives the settlor of the trust the power
to prevent the trustee from diverting the trust property to someone to whom
the settlor does not desire to give the trust property.
13. Clark v. United States, 267 F.2d 501 (1st Cir. 1959); Van Beuren
v. McLoughlin, 262 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991
(1959); Loughridge's Estate v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.).
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950). The trust property will be taxable to
the settlor's estate even though he has power to appoint himself one of
several co-trustees, since both § 2038 and § 2036 impose a tax where
a taxable power is vested in the settlor alone or in the settlor in con-
junction with any other person. See Clark v. United States, supra; Van
Beuren v. McLoughlin, supra.
14. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Helvering v. Tetz-
laff, 141 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Flanders, Ill F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1940); Day v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1937); Tait
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 74 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1935); Winchell v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Estate of Lena R. Arents,
34 T.C. 274 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 297 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 848 (1962); Estate of Frederick M. Kasch, 30 T.C.
102 (1958); Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949); ci.
Joseph Goldstein, 37 T.C. 897 (1962) (gift tax).
15. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2038-1 (a) (3), (b) (1958).
16. After stating that power in the settlor of a trust to appoint himself
trustee of the trust will not make the trust property taxable to his estate
under § 2038 if the settlor "only had the power to appoint himself trustee
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be any judicial authority. Section 2036(a) (2) imposes a tax where
a decedent during his life transferred property and retained power
to designate the income from, or the possession or enjoyment of,
the property during his life. According to the regulations, the tax
under section 2036(a) (2) applies even though the "exercise of the
power was subject to a contingency beyond the decedent's con-
trol which did not occur before his death ..... 17 The distinc-
tion made between sections 2038 and 2036 seems to be based on
the fact that section 2038 explicitly specifies that a power to
alter or revoke a transfer will be taxable under that section, even
though it is subject to a precedent giving of notice before it can be
exercised or takes effect only upon the expiration of a stated pe-
riod after the exercise of the power, while there is no correspond-
ing provision under section 2036. Apparently, the Treasury be-
lieves that the express reference to certain contingencies, which
will not preclude a tax under section 2038, implies that any other
contingencies will prevent a tax under that section. On the other
hand, the failure to specify any contingencies that will not pre-
vent a tax under section 2036 indicates that contingent powers
are taxable under that section. The regulations, in line with the
view that a contingent power is not taxable under section 2038, re-
fuse to impute the powers of the trustee to the settlor of the trust
for purposes of that section if the settlor's power to appoint himself
trustee is subject to a contingency beyond his control which has
not occurred at his death.18 There is an intimation in the regu-
lations, however, that a contingent power to appoint himself trus-
tee will be enough to impute the trustee's powers to the settlor of
the trust under section 2036(a) (2), 19 which is consistent with the
position taken by the regulations that a contingent power is taxable
under section 2036.20 It may be significant, however, that the
illustration given by the regulations of a power to appoint him-
self trustee, which will lead to imputing the trustee's powers to
the settlor of a trust under section 2036(a) (2), involves a situa-
under limited conditions which did not exist at the time of his death,"
§ 20.2038-1(a)(3) refers to the last two sentences of paragraph (b) of§ 20.2038-1. These sentences, after stating that a contingent power is not
taxable under § 2038, refer to § 2036(a)(2) of the Code, which taxes a
power to designate the income from, or the possession or enjoyment of,
property transferred by the decedent during his life. Section 20.2036-
1(b)(3), as the text indicates, provides that the fact that the power to
designate income or possession is dependent upon a contingency which has
not occurred before the decedent's death does not preclude a tax under
§ 2036.
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958).
18. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a) (3) (1958).
19. See regulation cited note 17 supra.
20. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958).
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tion where "the decedent reserved the unrestricted power to re-
move or discharge a trustee at any time and appoint himself as
trustee .... ,."1 In view of the doubt about what kind of power
to appoint himself trustee will make trust property taxable to the
estate of the settlor under section 2036(a) (2), it seems obvious
that in order to be certain that the trust property will not be taxed,
the settlor should not have any power to appoint himself trustee,
even a contingent power.
Even though the power to alter or revoke a trust is vested ex-
clusively in the trustee of a trust as far as the language of the trust
instrument is concerned, the trust property may be taxed to the es-
tate of the settlor of the trust if the trustee has a discretionary
power to pay over the trust property to the settlor and, under the
local trust law, creditors of the settlor can compel the trustees to
exercise this power in their favor. In Estate of Edgar M. Uhl,"2
the decedent created an inter vivos trust with directions to distrib-
ute 100 dollars a month from the income of the trust to himself.
The trustee was given discretion to distribute surplus income to
the settlor of the trust or to accumulate it for the remaindermen.
At the settlor's death, the Tax Court held that the trust property
was taxable to his estate on the theory that under Indiana law
his creditors could have reached the trust income that the trustee
could have paid to the settlor and the settlor had, therefore, re-
tained the right to the income from the trust during his life,
since he could in effect reach this income by incurring debts.2"
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in the Uhl
case,24 but it did not directly dispute its assumption that the set-
tlor of a trust is regarded for tax purposes as retaining any interest
in the trust which his creditors can reach. The appellate court de-
nied that under Indiana law the settlor's creditors could have
reached the trust property and refused to tax the property to the
settlor's estate on the ground that he had parted completely with
all interest in the trust property during his life.
The determinative factor in this type of case appears to be the
rights of the creditors of the settlor of the trust under the local
trust law. If they have the right to reach the trust property, it
would appear that this right will be imputed to the settlor and he
will be taxed accordingly. The Restatement of Trusts, as part of
21. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
22. 25 T.C. 22 (1955).
23. In Alice Spaulding Paolozzi, 23 T.C. 182 (1954), the Tax Court
held that a similar transfer was incomplete and was not taxable under the
gift tax, since the transferor could in effect revoke the transfer by incurring
debts.
24. In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
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its antipathy against spendthrift trusts in favor of the settlor of
the trust, lays down the flat rule that if a man creates a discre-
tionary trust in his own favor, his creditors can compel the trustee
to pay them anything which the trustee could in his discretion pay
the settlor of the trust.' It seems reasonably clear that in a
jurisdiction following the Restatement rule, it is impossible to re-
move property from the estate of a settlor by creating a trust un-
der which the trustee has discretion to pay over the trust property
to the settlor. If, however, the trust is governed by the law of a ju-
risdiction which rejects the Restatement rule, it is apparently pos-
sible to avoid an estate tax by such a trust.28
If the trustee's power to pay over the trust property to the set-
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 156(2) (1959), provides:
"Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a dis-
cretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount
which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply
for his benefit."
26. Strangely enough, with the exception of the Uld case, there does not
seem to have been any sustained attempt to tax a discretionary trust to the
estate of the settlor of the trust upon the theory that his creditors could
reach the trust property. In Alice Spaulding Paolozzi, 23 T.C. 182 (1954),
the Tax Court held that a transfer to a trust under which the trustees were
given discretion to pay over the trust property to the settlor of the trust
was an incomplete transfer that was not taxable under the gift tax because
the creditors of the grantor could reach whatever the trustees were em-
powered to pay the grantor. Inferentially, the transfer in the Paolozzi case
would have been taxable under the estate tax. In Herzog v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941), the Second Circuit held that a transfer to a
trust under which the trustees were given discretion to pay over the trust
property to the settlor or his wife was a complete transfer which was taxable
under the gift tax. The court refused to follow the Restatement, op. cit.
supra note 25, and hold that the creditors of the settlor could reach the
trust property. The court said that the New York law of trusts was not
clear upon this point, and in view of this uncertainty, it would accept the
conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals that the settlor's creditors could
not reach the trust property. In Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874 (S.D.
N.Y. 1942), a district court in New York held that a transfer in trust where
the settlor's brother and attorney had power to alter or revoke the trust
was a complete transfer which was taxable under the gift tax. The court
'cited the Herzog case without discussing the power of the settlor's credi-
tors to reach the trust property under the New York law. Rheinstrom v.
Commissioner, 105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939), is a similar case where the
court held that a transfer in trust was a complete transfer and taxable gift
of the part of the trust property which the trustees had complete discretion
to pay to the settlor of the trust. The court again did not discuss the right of
the settlor's creditors to reach the trust property. Commissioner v. Irving
Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945), is one of the few cases in this area
that involved the estate tax. The Second Circuit held that trust property
that the trustee had complete discretion to return to the settlor of the trust,
was not taxable to the settlor's estate because the settlor had not retained
any interest in the property. The court did not discuss the rights of the
creditors of the settlor to reach the trust property, although it cited the
Herzog case. This might indicate a feeling that they had no such right.
1962]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tlor of the trust is not completely discretionary, but is subject to a
definite objective standard under which the settlor has an equit-
able right to compel the trustee to pay over the trust property to
him, the trust property may be taxable to the settlor's estate. In
Blunt v. Kelly, 7 for example, where a decedent transferred prop-
erty in trust for herself for life with remainders over to her chil-
dren and gave the trustees power to pay over such principal to her
as they deemed proper for her "support, care or benefit," the trust
property was held to be taxable to the settlor's estate. Since the
trust was created before the statute was amended in 1931 to ex-
plicitly tax transfers with a reservation of a life estate, the court
did not impose the tax upon this ground. The court held, however,
that the decedent had an equitable right to compel the trustees
to pay her any principal that she needed for her support, care, or
benefit, and the retention of this equitable interest in the trust
property made the transfer to the trustees taxable as a transfer
taking effect at death. In Toeller's Estate v. Commissioner,8 the
Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion where the decedent
transferred property in trust and gave the trustees discretion to pay
him any principal necessary for his living expenses. The court
said that although the trustees' power was phrased in discre-
tionary terms, the presence of an objective standard under which
the settlor could compel payments gave him an equitable right
in the trust property, which made the transfer to the trustees tax-
able as a transfer taking effect at death. In these cases, the full
amount of the trust property was taxed to the settlors' estates,
since the potential invasion of the trust property was not limited
to any specific amount and there was a chance that the entire
property might revert to the setflor. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Hig-
gins,29 however, where the trustee's power to invade principal in
behalf of the settlor of the trust was limited to the amount neces-
sary to bring the trust income payable to the settlor up to 60,000
dollars a year, the court held that the amount taxable to the set-
tlor's estate was limited to the actuarial value of the principal that
might be paid over to the settlor in view of his life expectancy and
the annual yield of the trust property, since the potential invasion
of the trust property in behalf of the settlor could not exceed this
amount.
It is difficult to appraise the impact of these cases upon the
current law because of the restrictive definition of a transfer taking
27. 131 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1942).
28. 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948); accord, Estate of Ida Rosenwasser,
5 T.C. 1043 (1945).
29. 136 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1943).
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effect at death under the 1954 Code. Of course, if a man transfers
property and retains the income from the property for life as the
decedents did in Blunt v. Kelly,3" Toeller's Estate v. Commis-
sioner,3 Estate of Ida Rosenwasser, and Bankers Trust Co. v.
Higgins,33 the trust property is taxable to his estate under section
2036. But suppose that the only interest that the settlor retains in
the trust is the power granted to the trustee to pay over to the set-
tlor whatever the trustee deems necessary for the settlor's support;
will this make the trust property taxable to the grantor's estate
under the 1954 Code? The obvious difficulty with taxing the trans-
fer as a transfer taking effect at death under section 2037 is that
this section limits the tax to a case where the decedent's rever-
sionary interest in the transferred property was worth more than
five per cent of the value of the property immediately before his
death. If the right to be supported from the principal of a trust
fund is dependent upon the settlor's other income proving inade-
quate, how can the right be valued?3" If it is impossible to value
the settlor's right to the principal of the trust actuarially, will it be
valued at zero so that section 2037 will not apply, or since the
decedent's estate cannot prove the value of his reversionary inter-
est, will it be assumed that it is worth more than five per cent of
the value of the transferred property so that this requirement of
section 2037 will be complied with?
Apart from section 2037, it is possible that a trust where the
trustee has power to invade the trust property in behalf of the
settlor and this power is controlled by an ascertainable objective
standard may be taxed to the estate of the settlor of the trust
under sections 2038, 2036, and 2033. Section 2038 imposes a tax
where the decedent transferred property and at his death had pow-
er, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, to alter
the possession or enjoyment of the transferred property. Section
2036 imposes a tax where a decedent during his life transferred
property and retained either the possession or enjoyment of the
property or the right, either alone or in conjunction with some
30. 131 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1942).
31. 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948).
32. 5 T.C. 1043 (1945).
33. 136 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1943).
34. According to the Restatement of Trusts, op. cit. supra, note 25, the
creditors of a person who establishes a trust for his own support can compel
the trustee of the trust to pay over to them whatever the settlor could have
demanded for his own support. In this case, however, since the settlor of
the trust (unlike the settlor of a discretionary trust) can compel the trustee
to pay him whatever he needs for his support, the fact that his creditors




other person, to designate the possession or enjoyment of the prop-
erty. It is difficult to see how a power to require the trustee to pay
to the settlor principal needed for his support can be characterized
justly as a power to alter or designate the enjoyment of the trust
property. Since the power is a nondiscretionary power, which must
be exercised according to an ascertainable objective standard, an
exercise of it would appear to amount merely to carrying out the
trust according to its terms rather than altering or designating the
beneficial enjoyment of the trust property. If the settlor of a trust
declares himself trustee of property to pay the income to C for life
and the remainder to D and retains power to invade principal to
the extent that this is necessary for C's support, this is not a power
to alter or designate the enjoyment of the trust property that will
attract an estate tax under sections 2038 or 2036, but simply a
nondiscretionary power to carry out the trust according to its
terms. 5 The same reasoning appears to point to the conclusion
that the power of the settlor of a trust to demand from the trustee
whatever he needs for his support would not be a power to
alter or designate the enjoyment of the trust, but would be simply
a power to require the trustee to carry out the trust according to
its terms.36
There are also serious difficulties in imposing a tax upon a trust
where the trustee has power to invade the trust property for the
support of the settlor under section 2033, which taxes property
owned by the decedent at his death. Section 2033 is limited to
taxing inheritable interests that survive the death of the decedent
and pass from the decedent to another at his death.37 In the case
of a trust where the decedent's interest is limited to payments
necessary for his support, it seems obvious that his interest in the
trust will cease at his death. Moreover, if the decedent did have a
taxable interest under section 2033, it would appear to be an in-
terest incapable of valuation, which would have to be included at
zero in his gross estate.38
35. Estate of Robert W. Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); Estate of C. Dudley
Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949); cf. Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C.
1164 (1949).
36. The regulations under the gift tax provide that a power retained by
the settlor of a trust to name new beneficiaries or to change the interests of
the beneficiaries will make the transfer in trust incomplete and prevent a
taxable gift "unless the power is a fiduciary power limited by a fixed or
ascertainable standard." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958). The power
might also be treated as a contingent power that could only be exercised
when the settlor needed support. This would eliminate a tax under § 2038
if the settlor was not in need at his death, although it might not prevent a
tax under § 2036.
37. LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 4.1, at
25 (2d ed. 1962).
38. Estate of Charlotte D. M. Cardeza, 5 T.C. 202 (1945), al'd, 173
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Although it is difficult to see how a trust under which the trus-
tee is empowered to invade principal in behalf of the settlor of the
trust according to some objective standard is taxable to the set-
tlor's estate under the 1954 Code unless the settlor's interest
meets the five per cent requirement for a transfer taking effect
at death under section 2037, a district court recently upheld a tax
in this'situation. In United States Nat'l Bank v. United States, 9
the decedent during his life created a trust under which the trus-
tees were empowered to pay him up to 5,000 dollars a year from
principal in the event of "illness or other emergency." The court
held that part of the trust property taxable to decedent's estate that
was equal to the actuarial value of his right to the trust property
on the assumption that there was a maximum exercise of the power
over the settlor's life expectancy. The court cited Blunt v. Kelly'
without adverting to the fact that a different statutory definition of
a transfer taking effect at death was involved in that case. Origi-
nally, as the Supreme Court held in Estate of Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner,' the reversionary interest requisite for a transfer taking
effect at death did not have to exceed five per cent of the value
of the transferred property. This was true of the statute involved
in Blunt v. Kelly. It was only after the Spiegel case held that re-
tention of an infinitesimal possibility of reverter made a transfer
taxable as a transfer taking effect at death that the five per cent
requirement was written into the statute.
II. GIFT TAX
Until recently, the cases under the gift tax that involved trusts
that could be altered or revoked by one other than the settlor have
followed the cases under the estate tax. Where the settlor's only
connection with the trust was the hope that the trustee might
exercise an unrestricted power to alter or revoke the trust in his
favor, it has been held that the transfer was complete and a taxable
gift on the theory that the settlor had parted entirely with all inter-
est in the trust property.' Therefore, a power to alter or revoke
a trust that is vested in one other than the settlor does not prevent
the transfer to the trust from being a complete transfer and a
taxable gift.
F.2d 19 (3d. Cir. 1949); see LowNDEs & K7AmmR, op. cit. supra note 37,
ad'42:
.39. 188 F. Supp. 332 (D. Ore. 1960).
40. 131 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1942).
41. 335 U. S. 701 (1949).
42. Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941); Rheinstrom
v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939); Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F.
Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Minnie E. Deal, 29"T.C. 730 (1958); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
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If the settlor retains power to alter or revoke the trust, the trans-
fer to the trustee is incomplete and is not taxable as a gift"
unless the settlor can only exercise his power with the concurrence
of a person possessing an adverse interest in the trust property."'
This is true even if the settlor's power to alter the beneficial en-
joyment of the trust property does not extend to altering the trust
in his own favor. a5 By what appears to be the sounder and more
sophisticated view, a power to alter or revoke a trust that can be
exercised by the trustee only with the consent of the settlor of the
trust is a power vested jointly in the settlor and the trustee, which
prevents a taxable gift unless, of course, the trustee also has a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the trust.46 Looking realistically at the
practical operation of the power, it is a joint power with the trus-
tee rather than a power vested exclusively in the trustee subject
to the settlor's veto.47 Even though the terms of the trust instru-
ment give a trustee, other than the settlor of the trust, unrestricted
discretion about paying over the trust property to the settlor, the
transfer to the trust will not be complete for purposes of the gift
tax if under the local trust law the settlor's creditors are entitled
to reach the trust property." In substance, the settlor of the trust
has a power to revoke the trust by incurring debts; this prevents
the transfer to the trustee from being a taxable gift.49
If the trustee's power to pay over the trust property to the set-
tlor is limited by an ascertainable objective standard that gives the
settlor an equitable claim to the property, it would appear that
there would be a complete transfer and a taxable gift if the set-
tlor's interest is not susceptible of valuation. Robinette v. Helver-
ing5° and the companion case of Smith v. Shaughnessy1 are per-
tinent in this connection. In the Shaughnessy case, the taxpayer
transferred property to his 44-year-old wife for life when he was
72 years old. Upon the wife's death, the trust property was to re-
43. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Burnet
v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
44. Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952); see LOWNDES
& KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 624.
45. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
46. Cases cited note 11 supra. Although all of the cases cited in this
note involve the estate tax, they seem equally applicable to the gift tax.
47. See note 12 supra.
48. Alice Spaulding Paolozzi, 23 T.C. 182 (1954).
49. A good many cases where a discretionary power to revoke a trust
vested in a trustee other than the settlor of the trust was held not to prevent
a complete transfer and a taxable gift seem to have overlooked the possibil-
ity that the creditors of the settlor might compel the trustee to exercise this
power in their favor. See cases cited note 26 supra.
50. 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
51. 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
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vert to the settlor if he was still living and to the wife's testamentary
appointees if he was not living; if the wife failed to make an ap-
pointment, the trust property would go to her intestate successors
under New York law. The Supreme Court held that the value of
the settlor's reversionary interest in the trust could be subtracted
from the amount of his taxable gifts since it was susceptible of
actuarial valuation. In Robinette, the taxpayer transferred property
in trust, reserving the income from the property to herself for
life. If her mother and stepfather survived her, they were to get
the income from the trust property during their lives. Upon the
death of the last surviving life tenant, the trust property was to go
to the issue of the settlor who attained 21, and in default of such
issue, to the testamentary appointees of the last surviving life ten-
ant. The Supreme Court refused to let the taxpayer subtract from
the taxable gift the value of her possibility of appointing the trust
property if she survived her mother and stepfather and was not
survived by any issue who attained 21 since it was impossible to
value her reversionary interest.
Im. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It has been generally assumed that the doctrine of the Robinette
and Shaughnessy cases is that the retention of a reversionary in-
terest in connection with the gratuitous transfer of property will
not prevent a taxable gift of the full value of the property unless
the value of the reversionary interest can be definitely ascertain-
ed. 51 The first case to cast serious doubt on this interpretation
was Estate of Christianna K. Gramm. 3 In that case the taxpayer
transferred all of her estate, amounting to approximately 83,000
dollars, to trustees who were directed to pay her the income from
the property during her life with remainders over at her death.
The trustees were empowered to invade corpus in behalf of the
settlor of the trust for her "comfort, education, maintenance and
52. In Daisy B. Plummer, 2 T.C. 263 (1943), where the settlor of the
trust retained the income from trust for life along with a power to call for
principal up to $15,000 a year, the court held that he had made a taxable
gift of the value of the trust property less the value of his life interest and
$15,000 a year principal multiplied by his life expectancy.
The regulations say that if the trustee's power to pay over the trust
property to the grantor "is limited by a fixed or ascertainable standard ...
enforceable by or on behalf of the grantor, then the gift is incomplete
to the extent of the ascertainable value of any rights thus retained by the
grantor." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958). The implication from the
regulations appears to be that if it is impossible to value the grantor's
retained interest in the trust property, there will be a gift of the full value
of the property.
53. 17 T.C. 1063 (1951).
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support." The Tax Court held that the creation of the trust did not
constitute a taxable gift. It was obvious, of course, that the settlor
had not made a gift of the income from the trust, which she re-
served for her life, but the court held that there had been no gift
of the principal of the trust. The reasoning of the case is obscure.
The court distinguished the Herzog case54 (where the existence
of a power in the trustee to pay over the trust property to the
settlor of the trust was held not to preclude a complete transfer
and a taxable gift) on the ground that the trustee's power there
was a completely discretionary power that was not limited by any
ascertainable objective standard. Even though the settlor in the
Gramm case had a clearer equitable claim to get the trust property
than the settlor did in the Herzog case, it is very difficult to
reconcile Gramm with Robinette v. Helvering since it is hard to see
how the settlor's possibility of reaching the principal of the trust in
the Gramm case could be valued with any degree of certainty. Af-
ter considerable hesitation, the Service seems to have finally ac-
cepted the Gramm case.55 According to Revenue Ruling 54-
538,"6 the amount of the trust in the Gramm case, which com-
prised the taxpayer's entire estate, was so small that there was a
probability of substantial invasion of the trust property in behalf of
the settlor, which made it unlikely that any beneficiary other than
the settlor would ever actually receive the trust property. This pre-
vented the transfer to the trust from being a complete transfer
and a taxable gift.
After the decision in the Gramm case, the Tax Court decided
another case which is perhaps even more difficult to reconcile
with the Robinette case. In Sarah Gilkey Vander Weele,57 the
taxpayer transferred about 28,000 dollars of her own securities
and a remainder worth approximately 565,000 dollars in her
grandfather's estate in trust. Under the terms of the trust, the
trustees were to pay over the income from the settlor's own se-
curities to the settlor until the remainder in her grandfather's es-
tate vested in possession and the trustees received it from the grand-
father's estate. After that, the trustees were authorized to pay the
settlor such income from the trust as they should deem desirable
54. Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
55. Originally, the Commissioner acquiesced in the Gramm case. 1952-
1 CuM. BULL. 2. Later, however, he withdrew his acquiescence. 1957-2
CuM. BULL. 8. Recently, however, the Commissioner changed his mind
again and, withdrawing his nonacquiescence, announced that he acquiesced
in the Gramm case. 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 7; Rev. Rul. 62-
13, 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 20.
56. 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 316.
57. 27 T.C. 340 (1956), a/f'd, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958).
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and ample for her "comfortable well-being and enjoyment." There
was a further provision in the trust empowering the trusttes to
invade principal in behalf of the settlor to the extent that they
felt that this was necessary to assure her comfortable well-being
and enjoyment. The evidence surrounding the creation of the trust
showed that the settlor had turned the trust property over to the
trustees because she was inexperienced in managing property. Al-
though she created remainders in the trust for her children, her
primary concern was to provide for her own comfort and welfare,
and the trustees agreed to exercise their discretion in paying the
trust property over to her liberally with this end in view. Both the
Tax Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the taxpayer had not made a complete transfer or a
taxable gift because of the trustees' power to pay over the trust
property to the taxpayer. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit em-
phasized the fact that under local trust law, the creditors of the
settlor could reach the trust property to the extent that the trustees
could pay it over to the settlor. Therefore, she had in substance
retained the power to revoke the trust by creating debts. In hold-
ing that there was no gift of the income from the trust during the
settlor's life, the Tax Court also stressed the right of the settlor's
creditors to reach the income from the trust that the trustees could
pay to her. But in refusing to find a gift of the principal of the
trust, the Tax Court argued that the power vested in the trustees
to invade principal in behalf of the settlor prevented the transfer
of principal from being complete, declaring that
In view of the fact that petitioner created the trust here in issue for
the purpose of providing for her personal financial security and the
further fact that the corpus of the trust was subject to an unlimit-
ed possibility of withdrawal, we are of the opinion that the execu-
tion of the deed of trust on March 25, 1950, and the transfer of as-
sets pursuant thereto did not result in a taxable gift within the mean-
ing of section 1000 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.U
The fact that the Vander Weele case was decided under the 1939
rather than the 1954 Code is not significant since the question of
whether there was a complete transfer and a taxable gift is the
same under either statute.
In Revenue Ruling 62-13,11 the Service acquiesced in the
Vander Weele case on the ground that
[Wlhere property is transferred to a trust under the terms of which
the trustee is given very broad discretionary powers over the distribu-
58. Id. at 346.
59. 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 20. Before this ruling, which
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tion to the grantor of income and corpus, and where, even though the
value of the property transferred is large in amount, under the circum-
stances there appears to be no assurance at the time of creating the
trust that anything of value will be paid to a beneficiary (or class of
beneficiaries) other than the grantor, such transfer constitutes, for pur-
poses of the federal gift tax statute, an incomplete transfer and,
hence, does not result in a taxable gift. 60
It should be noted that in acquiescing in the Vander Weele case
the Service did not refer to the fact that under local law the set-
tlor's creditors could reach the trust property. Apparently, the
ruling attempts to get away from local trust law and establish a
uniform rule: any transfer under which the trustee's powers to
pay over trust property to the settlor makes it uncertain whether
any other beneficiary will ever receive the trust property is an in-
complete transfer which will not be regarded as a taxable gift un-
der the gift tax.
It is not entirely clear just what Revenue Ruling 62-13 meant
in stating that there would not be a taxable gift where "under the
circumstances there appears to be no assurance" that beneficiaries
other than the settlor of the trust will take the trust property. Are
the circumstances to which the ruling refers the fact that the trus-
tees have an unlimited discretion in paying over the trust property
to the settlor of the trust, so that the mere existence of such a
power prevents a taxable gift? Or are the "circumstances" referred
to extrinsic evidence (like the evidence in the Vander Weele case
of the understanding that the trustees would exercise their discre-
tion liberally in favor of the settlor of the trust) that makes it im-
probable that anyone other than the settlor of the trust will ever
actually receive the trust property? It seems obvious that if the
completeness of a transfer cannot be determined from the terms of
the transfer, but instead involves a search into the extrinsic evi-
dence surrounding the transfer, ascertaining the existence of a tax-
able gift is going to be drawn into considerable confusion and
uncertainty.
The major difficulty with the Treasury's interpretation of the
Vander Weele case in Revenue Ruling 62-13 is reconciling it
with the Supreme Court's decision in Robinette v. Helvering,r'
where the Court held that a possibility of the settlor regaining
property transferred to a trust cannot be deducted from the, set-
tlor's taxable gifts unless the possibility is susceptible of valuation.
acquiesces in the Vander Weele case, the Commissioner had refused to
accept that decision. 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 8.
60. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 21.
61. 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
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Since the settlor's chance of regaining the trust property in the
Vander Weele case was obviously impossible to value, it would
appear that she made a gift of the trust property. Revenue Ruling
62-13 distinguishes the Robinette case in a fashion which is more
of a credit to verbal agility than a constructive contribution to the
predictability of the tax law in this area. According to the ruling,
the Robinette case only applies where "it has already been deter-
mined that a gift has been made and the issue concerns the
valuation of an interest retained by the donor. ''1 2 This sounds as
though it has more meaning than it actually does. In all of the
cases where a donor retains an interest in transferred property
there has been a formal transfer, and the only way to determine
whether there has been a taxable gift is by considering the possi-
bility of valuing the settlor's retained interest. In the Vander
Weele case, for example, the settlor created remainders in the trust
property for her children that looked just as much like a gift as
the remainders that the settlor in the Robinette case gave to the
testamentary appointees of her mother or stepfather. The only prac-
tical way of determining the extent to which the remainders in
either case were given away for purposes of the gift tax is the
possibility of valuing the donor's reversionary interest.
As far as clarifying the law is concerned, the Treasury could
have done a better job in Revenue Ruling 62-13 if it had limited
the Vander Weele case to a discretionary trust that was revocable
because the settlor's creditors possessed power to reach the trust
property under local trust law. Not only is it very hard to recon-
cile the Treasury's interpretation of the Vander Weele case with
the Supreme Court's decision in Robinette v. Helvering, but it is dif-
ficult to tell just what the Treasury's position on the Vander
Weele case actually is since the ruling declares that there will be
an incomplete transfer, which will not be taxed under the gift
tax, where there is a transfer in trust and "under the circum-
stances there appears to be no assurance at the time of creating
the trust that anything of value will be paid to a beneficiary (or
class of beneficiaries) other than the grantor." The ruling does not
make it clear whether the "circumstances" which prevent the
transfer from being complete are the mere existence of the un-
controlled power in the trustee to invade the trust property in be-
half of the settlor or extrinsic evidence indicating a probability
that the power will be exercised in favor of the settlor.
A comparison of Minnie E. Deal' with the decision of the
Vander Weele case illustrates the uncertainty in this area. In the
62. 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 22.
63. 29 T.C. 730 (1958).
19621
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Deal case, the taxpayer transferred land worth 66,000 dollars to
her three sons-in-law in trust to pay to her whatever income from
the property they felt, in their discretion, that she required for her
reasonable needs and to accumulate the balance until her death,
when the trust property was to be distributed to the settlor's four
daughters. The Tax Court held, despite the manifest possibility
that none of the income from the trust might actually be paid to
the remaindermen, that there was a gift of the full value of the
trust property: "Accordingly, we hold, if for no other reason than
a failure of proof, that the value of the remainder interest con-
veyed in trust for the benefit of petitioner's four daughters was
$66,000 as determined by the respondent."64 The Deal case was
decided after the Vander Weele case. It looks like a simple appli-
cation of the Robinette case: the retention of an interest in property
by the donor of the property will not prevent a taxable gift of the
full value of the property unless the donor proves the value of the
retained interest. If this is true, then how can the Gramm and
Vander Weele cases be reconciled with the decision in Robinette
v. Helvering?
Perhaps the principal merit of the Treasury approach to the
Gramm and Vander Weele cases is that it may force a reappraisal
of the decisions which have held that a trust that can be altered
or revoked by one other than the settlor of the trust is a complete
transfer, which is taxable under the gift tax rather than the estate
tax. As a matter of sound tax policy, it seems clear that such a
trust should be treated as an incomplete transfer, which is taxable
under the estate tax rather than the gift tax. Normally, the only
reason why the creator of a trust would vest power in the trustee
to alter or revoke the trust, rather than retaining the power him-
self, would be to keep control over the trust property during his
life without subjecting the property to the estate tax at his death.
The proper way to deal with this situation is to tax the trust un-
der the estate tax rather than the gift tax. Furthermore, it is ridicu-
lous to tax a trust that the settlor cannot revoke without the con-
sent of a person possessing a substantial adverse interest in the
trust under the estate tax and to exempt a trust that can be re-
voked by a nonadverse person alone.
If the Treasury is going to take the position that a transfer
to a trust is an incomplete transfer that is not taxable under the
gift tax if the trustee, other than the settlor, is given a broad dis-
cretionary power to alter or revoke the trust, then it would seem
that it will be compelled to contend that the transfer in trust is
also incomplete and taxable under the estate tax. Although the es-
64. Id. at 735.
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tate and gift taxes are not correlated to the extent that they are
mutually exclusive so that a transfer which is taxable under one
tax is not taxable under the other, it seems clear that they were in-
tended to be mutually inclusive in the sense that a transfer which
escapes one tax must be caught under the other."5 The recent rul-
ing of the Internal Revenue Service treating a transfer to a trust
under which the trustee has power to alter or revoke the trust as
an incomplete transfer, which is not taxable under the gift tax,"
suggests that the next step which the Service must take will be to
contend that this type of trust is taxable under the estate tax. If
the Service succeeds in taking this step, it will, of course, put an
end to avoidance of an estate tax by means of a transfer to an
inter vivos trust under which one other than the settlor of the
trust is given power to alter or revoke the trust.
Although there is authority to the effect that a transfer to a
trust that can be altered or revoked by one other than the settlor
of the trust is a complete transfer, which is not taxable under the
estate tax,67 it is far from clear that this is an inevitable construc-
tion of the Code. It is true that literally sections 2038 and 2036
limit the tax to situations where the settlor of a trust possesses a
taxable power over the trust property that he can exercise either
alone or in conjunction with another person. It would not require
an insuperable feat of construction, however, to identify a non-
adverse person with the settlor of the trust and to attribute the
power to alter or revoke the trust to the settlor on the theory that
the nonadverse holder of the power is his alter ego or agent. It is
true that this construction departs from the literal language of the
statute. There are, however, substantial considerations of tax policy
which might justify such an equitable, rather than a literal, con-
struction of the Code.
If a person creates a trust and gives someone else, like the trus-
tee, power to alter the trust, but provides that this power cannot be
exercised in favor of the settlor himself, there is a complete trans-
fer which is taxable as a gift." Presumably, under the existing
decisions it is also a complete inter vivos transfer which is not
taxable under the estate tax. Since in this situation the creator of
the trust cannot recover the trust property, there is less reason to
tax the transfer under the estate tax than there is to tax a transfer
which can be revoked by the trustee so that the settlor of the trust
65. See LowNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 614-15.
66. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 5, at 20.
67. See notes 2-8 supra and accompanying text.
68. Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942); Joseph
Goldstein, 37 T.C. 897 (1962).
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property may regain the trust property. It is well settled, however,
that a trust which can be altered by the settlor of the trust, al-
though it cannot be altered in his own favor, is taxable under the
estate tax69 and is not taxable under the gift tax.7" If the power
of a nonadverse person to revoke a trust is to be attributed to the
settlor of the trust in order to tax the trust property to his estate,
then the power of a nonadverse person to alter the trust, which
does not extend to revoking the trust or returning the trust property
to the settlor, should probably also be attributed to the settlor.
If a completely discretionary power to alter or revoke a trust
that is vested in one other than the settlor of the trust will result
in taxing the trust property to the settlor's estate, it would seem
that a power to pay over the trust property to the settlor that is
subject to an ascertainable objective standard should also result
in taxing the trust property to the settlor's estate. But if it can be
established that there is virtually no chance that the trust property
will be returned to the settlor because of the limitations on the
power and the circumstances of the particular situation, then the
trust property should not be taxed to the settlor's estate. If, more-
over, the maximum amount that might be paid over to the settlor
under the power can be ascertained, then the estate tax should
be limited to this amount.
Although there does not seem to be any direct authority for
this result, there are persuasive analogies. In Clement v. Smith,71
a man transferred property to his father and a trust company as
trustees to accumulate the income from the trust property during
the settlor's life, retaining control over the remainder in the prop-
erty after his death. The trust provided that the trustees could pay
over any income that they saw fit to the settlor's father for his
maintenance and support during the settlor's life. The father was
independently wealthy so there was virtually no chance that the
trustees would ever be able to pay him any of the trust income
under a power limited to his maintenance and support. Conse-
quently, the court held that the settlor had not transferred any
part of the trust property or made a taxable gift. Clement v. Smith
relied upon McHugh v. United States,72 where a woman trans-
ferred preferred stock worth 24,350 dollars to a trust company
for her sister-in-law with directions to pay the income from the
trust to the sister-in-law for ten years or until her death. The trus-
tee was also authorized to pay over any principal that it deemed
69. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
70. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
71. 167 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
72. 142 F. Supp. 927 (Ct. C1. 1956).
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desirable to meet the "essential needs" of the sister-in-law if her
other funds were insufficient for this purpose. The Commissioner
imposed a gift tax on the full value of the stock transferred to the
trustee on the ground that due to the power of invasion all of the
trust property might be paid over to the sister-in-law. The court
held, however, that in view of the sister-in-law's financial circum-
stances there was virtually no possibility that the principal of the
trust could be invaded under a power that was limited to her
essential needs and that there was no gift of principal. These cases
followed the decisions holding that a remainder to charity will
not be deductible if there is a possibility of diverting the property
from the charity unless the power of invading the trust property
is limited by an ascertainable standard,73 which under the cir-
cumstances of the case, makes it virtually impossible that any
diversion will actually occur.
Of course, the Clement and McHugh cases raised the question
of whether there was a taxable gift of property that one other
than the donor was empowered to pay over to the donee; they
held that if the power was so limited that under the circumstances
of the case there was virtually no chance of its exercise, there
would not be a gift. The immediate question is whether a power
to pay over property to the settlor of a trust that is vested in one
other than the setflor will prevent a taxable gift if the power is
subject to objective limitations that make it virtually impossible for
any payment to be made to the settlor under the specific circum-
stances. It seems plain, however, that if the impossibility of exer-
cising a power to transfer property to one other than the donor of
the property prevents a taxable gift, the inability to exercise a
power to return property to a donor justifies disregarding the
power for tax purposes and treating the transfer by the donor as
a complete transfer and a taxable gift. By the same token, no prop-
erty should be included in the settlor's estate under the estate tax
that is beyond the settlor's range of effective recall by virtue of the
fact that there is virtually no chance that a power to return the
property to the settlor can be exercised due to the limitations on
the power and the circumstances of the particular situation.
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that as a matter of sound tax policy a man should
not be allowed to escape the estate tax upon property over which
73. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595
(1949); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943);
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
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he retains effective control during his life. A trust under which
the trustee of the trust has complete discretion over altering or
revoking the trust should be taxed under the estate tax rather than
the gift tax. There are decisions that hold that such trusts represent
complete transfers, which fall under the gift tax rather than the
estate tax, at least if under local law the trustee has complete dis-
cretion about paying over the trust property to the settlor of the
trust, and cannot be compelled to pay anything that he might pay
to the settlor to the settlor's creditors. The Treasury's recent ac-
quiescence in the Vander Weele case, which treats a transfer to
a trust that can be altered or revoked by one other than the set-
tlor of the trust as an incomplete transfer which is not taxable un-
der the gift tax, appears to compel a reappraisal of the cases that
treat such trusts as complete transfers which are not taxable under
the estate tax. Until this reappraisal has taken place or has been
definitely abandoned, one who creates a trust under which a person
other than the settlor is given power to alter or revoke the trust in
the expectation of avoiding the estate tax without losing control
over the trust property should anticipate that he may be disap-
pointed.
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